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TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL SURVIVAL
IN SEPTEMBER OF 1989, any Eurocrats relaxing at the Chaloupe d'Or
caf6 in the Grand'Place of central Brussels must have looked at the scene
unfolding before them in horror. While a massive outdoor screen bom-
barded the crowd with advertisements for a U.S. film television channel,
young women distributed brochures with photos of such U.S. films as
"Rocky IV," "Dirty Dancing," and "Black Widow."' Scenes such as this
had been repeating themselves throughout the European Union all too
often in recent years, and in reply, the Council of Ministers of the
European Union responded with a shot that resounded throughout the
global trading community.2
INTRODUCTION
The Council Directive On the Coordination of Certain Provisions
Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member
States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities was
passed on October 3, 1989? The "Television Without Frontiers Direc-
' Howard LaFranchi, Europeans Balk at Rising Tide of American Movies, CHRIs-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 29, 1989, at 9.
2 The Council of Ministers acts upon legislative proposals emanating from the
European Commission. See TREATY ESTABLISmNG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNrrY [EEC TREATY] arts. 145, 146, 155, 157 (as amended 1992). The European
Commission presently consists of 20 members chosen by the Member States according
to population and has as its primary responsibility the initiation of legislative proposals.
See generally THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1995-2000 (1995) (explaining the function
of the European Commission). The European Parliament is comprised of directly elected
representatives of the Member States and may give advice on proposed legislation.
JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 10-17 (1992). The Council of Ministers
consists of representatives from each of the Member States and has the final power to
enact any proposed legislation. Id.
' Council Directive 89/552, 1989 OJ. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Directive]. For a
thorough overview of the legislative history of the Directive, see Paul Presburger &
Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by the
New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 495
(1990). Directives are legislative enactments of the European Union that are intended
to be addressed to, and binding on, Member States, either collectively or individually
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tive," as the Directive has come to be popularly known, has obliged the
Member States of the European Union for the past seven years to reserve
the majority of their television broadcasting hours for programs of a
European origin.' Brussels maintains that the Directive is necessary to
protect the fragile culture of the European Union and its Member States
and European unity as a whole from encroaching destruction via the
massive influx of television programs of non-European works.5 At the
same time, Washington and Hollywood claim that television production
is a commercial activity and the Directive is nothing more than economic
protectionism.6
First, this Note will examine the background and cultural rationale
for the Directive and the necessity for action on the part of the European
Union to protect the culture of the Member States and European culture
as a whole. Next, it substantiates the ability of the European Union to
legislate in the realm of culture as well as economics. Finally, this Note
concludes that the Directive is legal with respect to international law via
the exclusion of audiovisuals from the newly instituted General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), and therefore, the United States
should work within the standards allowed by the Directive. This will be
best accomplished by co-production, which will allow Hollywood to tap
the lucrative European Union market and the Europeans to protect and
preserve their heritage.
I. BACKGROUND
As the technological revolution of the 1980s took hold in Europe
and cable television stations and satellite transmissions began beaming
into the homes of Europeans, it became obvious that the traditional State
monopolies that had existed since the 1940s had outlived their useful-
and require implementation by the Member States before they are fully effective in law.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 20.
4 The term "European Union" has replaced "European Community" as of January
1, 1994. See EEC Treaty, art. A. At the time of the Directive's inception, "European
Community" was the proper terminology. For purposes of this Note, the more current
"European Union" will be used. Currently, 15 States comprise the European Union:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See gener-
ally KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1995).
- See Hift, TV Trade War Heats Up, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 2, 1989, at
10 [hereinafter TV Trade War].
6 See Valenti Charges E.C. Protectionism on Audiovisuals, REUTER NEWSWIRE, Dec.
15, 1993 [hereinafter Valenti Charges].
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ness.7 Since the early days of television, Member States had viewed
broadcasting as an integral attribute of their national sovereignty, control-
ling everything from broadcast frequencies to news programs However,
this degree of control was problematic in light of the growing world trade
system and economic interdependence among nations, as well as changes
in technology and deregulation sweeping across Europe.9
In response to these developments, as early as 1984, the Commission
issued the Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for
Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable."0 This document was a
foreshadowing of the Directive, giving preparatory notice of the need to
harmonize the many disparate national laws of the Member States regard-
ing television broadcasting." The Commission declared that television
reached an impressive number of people in the Member States and had
extraordinary cultural significance. 2 More important, the Commission
specifically recognized that television broadcasting would "play an
important part in developing and nurturing awareness of the rich variety
of Europe's common cultural and historical heritage," and "contribute
towards a more widespread European identity" 3 Also, the great danger
of "cultural domination" through television broadcasting was understood,
' Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers: Green
Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Sat-
ellite and Cable, COM(84)300 final at 11. [hereinafter Green Paper]. European states
have historically controlled television through state subsidization and control over
programming content. Etu NOAM, TELEvisION N EUROPE 3 (1991).
' NOAM, supra note 7. In contrast, the United States has historically adopted a free
market approach to television broadcasting, allowing market values to largely dictate the
success or failure of the private broadcasters. Rationing 'Dallas' in Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1989, at A26.
" See Richard Collins, The Screening of Jacques Tati: Broadcasting and Cultural
Identity in the European Community, 11 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 361, 361 (1993).
"Technological change, the restructuring of the international political order on the basis
of shared sovereignty, the growth of world trade, and the consequential increase of
economic interdependence among states have made organization of media regulation and
support of media industries by political authorities (and by national governments in
particular) problematic." Id. "As France's Jean Dondelinger (E.C. Cultural Commis-
sioner) warned in 1989, a chaotic deregulation of European broadcasting combined with
an 'avalanche' of U.S. programming, was posing a threat of 'cultural suicide' to the
nations of the Community." LouIsE B. VAN TARTWuK-NOVEY, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, EUROPE IN THE 1990S: ON THE ROAD TO UNrrY 69
(1992).
,D Green Paper, supra note 7.
" Id. at 1.
,2 Id. at 23.
13 Id. at 28, 32.
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along with recognition of the fact that the United States contributed the
majority of films broadcast on European television.14
The 1984 Green Paper served as the guideline for the Commission's
proposal in 1986 of a directive to regulate television broadcasting within
the European Union.15 The Commission's objective was to take advan-
tage of television programming and its cultural influence recognized in
the 1984 Green Paper to further its goal of Union.16 This was to be
accomplished through the "establishment of a general preference for the
distribution of television programmes of all kinds produced within the
Community."' 7 Such a preference was to be accomplished through the
reservation of thirty percent of broadcast time (excluding news, advertis-
ing, game shows, and sporting events) for "Community works"; however,
this percentage was to be increased to sixty percent by 1992."8
After three years of deliberations, the Council accepted the
Commission's proposal and sent it to the European Parliament for amend-
ments." In response to United States pressure," after intense debate the
Parliament approved a substantially modified version of the Commission's
proposal, and in October of 1989 the Council formally adopted the
"4 Id. at 33. Europeans, deeply aware of their past, remain conscious of the cor-
relation between national memory (fundamentally a cultural affair) and national inde-
pendence (a political affair) and have a deep-seated fear of having the icons of their
ancestry replaced with the symbols of a foreign culture. Laurence G. C. Kaplan,
Comment, The European Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive:
Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMoRY INT'L L. REv. 255, 262 n.23 (1994),
citing Steven Ruth, The Regulation of Spillover Transmission from Direct Broadcast
Satellites in Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107, 108 (1989). In 1989, sales of U.S.-
produced programming for television were in excess of $820 million annually in
Europe, with a doubling of the market expected by 1993. LaFranchi, supra note 1, at
9.
"5 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation of Administrative Action in Member States .Concerning the
Pursuit of Broadcasting Activities, 1986 OJ. (C 179) 4 [hereinafter Proposal].
16 EEC Treaty, art. 2.
"7 Proposal, supra note 15, preamble. Through the promotion of a wide variety of
European television programs, the Commission intended that the citizens of the Member
States "deepen their knowledge of each other's culture and development and contribute
towards a more widespread European identity." Green Paper, supra note 7, at 32.
"S Proposal, supra note 15, art. 2. For a discussion of what constitutes a "Com-
munity work," see infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
" See Kelly L. Wilkins, Television Without Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Pre-
miere, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. RaV. 195, 197-98 (1991).
' See Aggressive U.S. Stance on Quotas May Have Hurt More Than Helped, VARI-
ETY, Oct. 4-10, 1989, at 2.
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Television Without Frontiers Directive.2' Major changes included restric-
tions on joint production with non-Member States and a reduction of the
quota on broadcasting of European works to just over fifty percent.'
This reduction from the original Commission proposal angered some
Parliamentary representatives who worried that the Directive was too
"watered down."'
The debates in the Parliament indicate that the primary motivation of
the European Union in enacting the Directive was to protect, preserve,
and promote European cultural identity through the use of television
broadcasts.24 Through the Directive, the European Union was seeking to
encourage the development of the European television industry so as to
create and produce more programs with European characteristics, which
would logically expose viewers to more European culture, and thereby
protect and preserve the culture of the Member States, and indeed Euro-
pean culture, from the invasion of U.S. television programs.' Fear and
anger over the threat of the large popularity and prevalence of U.S.
television programs to the cultural identity of Europe resulted in the
Directive as an effort to turn back the tide of overwhelming U.S. cultural
domination.'
The Directive was adopted on October 3, 1989, by a vote of ten to
2, Wilkins, supra note 19 at 198. At one extreme of the debate surrounding the
Directive was Representative Cassidy, who, just before losing speaking rights for
declaring the Parliament's President a "fascist," called the Directive protectionist.
Timothy M. Lupinacci, Note, The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the
European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 115 n.40 (1991). On the other side was Representative DeVries,
who recognized that European culture is of major significance to the European Union.
Id.
" Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, art. 4.
Debates of the European Parliament, Pursuit of Broadcasting Activities, 1989 OJ.
(2-378) 110, 117 [hereinafter Pursuit].
24 Id. at 118. To the European mind, the strongest foundation for a collective
European identity is a congruence of strong national identities, tempered by the recog-
nition that Europe is relatively small, and the nations within evolved together and thus
share deep common roots. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 329.
s See Pursuit, supra note 23, at 120. See also TV Trade War, supra note 5, at 10.
Pursuit, supra note 23, at 114. This fear was compounded by the realization that
European viewers were becoming so accustomed to the plots and style of U.S. televi-
sion programs that the citizens of the Member States had given up attempting to accept
each others programs. LaFranchi, supra note 1, at 9. "Today, one of the foremost
concerns of Europeans . . . is the political management of unity and difference." THE
MULTI-CULTURAL PLANET: THE REPORT OF A UNESCO INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP
29 (1993).
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two, with Belgium and Denmark dissenting on the grounds that the
European Union lacked competence to regulate television broadcastingY
Immediately, the United States protested that the Directive was in no way
created as a measure to protect the culture of the European Union and the
Member States, but that, rather, the Directive was an example of almost
insidious economic protectionism., Carla Hills, then United States Trade
Representative, argued the European Union was restricting freedom of
choice, and staunchly maintained that the European Union's cultural
rational for the Directive was blatantly false.29
II. THE NEED FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION TO PROTECT AGAINST
"CULTURAL IMPERIALISM"
"Culture" encompasses much more than the common idea that a
nation's culture is simply embodied in its art and literature."° In reality,
a nation's culture is comprised of "all the diverse elements, ideas, atti-
tudes, and objects-such as a toothbrush, a sportscar, a way of asking for
a drink, or the meaning attached to a gesture or a grimace-which go to
make up life."
31
It is the "pattern of living" of the members of a society that distin-
guishes them from another society. 2 These behavioral patterns include
the way people eat, the way they dress, their lifestyle, and methods of
communicating with each other.33 Members of a society share a set of
common values, beliefs, and norms that forge a common bond between
its members and provide for continuity from generation to generation.34
To this end, television broadcasting forms an extremely important part of
a nation's cultural life, "and is the most effective and universally accepted
means of upholding and developing the national culture, that is, the
identity and ultimately the very existence of the country concerned." 3
See Lupinacci, supra note 21, at 115.
2 See Peter Turell, U.S. Criticizes E.C. Over Issue of T.V., Seeks Arbitration, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 1989, at A15. None of the parties involved in the debate over the
Directive (i.e. the United States and the European Union) ever denied the importance
of culture or that it was worth protecting, rather, the United States claimed that there
simply was no culture-protection basis in the Directive and no genuine need for Europe
to protect its culture in this particular situation. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 285.
29 See U.S. Outraged by E.C. Move to Restrict Foreign T.V. Programs, 6 INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA) 1292 (Oct. 11, 1989).
3o SUSAN DOUGLAS & BERNARD DUBOIS, MARKETING SCIENCE INSTTrTE, CULTURE





3" Council of Europe, Steering Committee on the Mass Media (CDMM), Observa-
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The Directive was passed in order to protect and facilitate cultural
exchanges via television programs among the Member States, thereby
promoting European integration. 6 Through the promotion of European-
produced television programs, Europeans will "deepen their knowledge of
each other's culture and development and contribute towards a more
widespread European identity."37
There does exist a single European culture, but it is made up of a nu-
ance of varieties and differences. It is like a patchwork blanket made up
of several elements, and the role of the television is to reflect this
diversity.38
While the European Union, through the Directive, is intent on
fostering the growing notion of a distinct European identity as a means
of strengthening the Union and the common market, it believes that this
can only be accomplished by protecting the cultures of the Member States
from U.S. "cultural domination."' In effect, the European Union believes
dons of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) on the Green Paper "Television
Without Frontiers" of the Commission of the European Communities, CDMM (85)2
(Jan. 25, 1985), at 5 [hereinafter CDMM]. "A pattern of behavior shaped by a certain
set of motivations turns out by a plausible coincidence to serve remotely related ends.
A person sits down to watch a television program because he wants to be entertained
and by some mysterious process ends up . .. establishing solidarity with a larger
community." JAMES NV. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA AND
SOCIETY 54 (1989). See also Stuart Hall, The Local and the Global: Globalization and
Ethnicity, in CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND TIE WORLD-SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY
CONDrIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF IDENTrrY 19, 27 (Anthony D. King ed.,
1991) [hereinafter WORLD-SYSTEM] (U.S. culture is supplanting other cultures of the
world, and television is the dominant method being used).
Green Paper, supra note 7, at 28.
Id. at 32. The European Union recognizes that some television programs will
have more of the desired effect than others, hence the exemption for news, advertising,
game shows, and sporting events. Directive, supra note 3, art. 4. In a roundtable
discussion with U.S. broadcast industry and government representatives, the European
Union's head of the Directorate-General for Information, Communications, and Culture
"stressed that the E.C. is not at all interested in cultivating a homogenized European
identity or European product in the cultural field. The aim of the E.C. initiatives in the
cultural field are not to promote a Euro-culture, but to preserve the diversity of cultures
in the E.C. at the present. The E.C. wants citizens of each Member State to be able
to respect peoples from different countries and to understand the diverse cultural heri-
tages within the Community." THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS STUDIES PRO-
GRAM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMUNICATION POLICIES: AN UPDATE 4 (1991)
[hereinafter COMMUNICATION POLICIES].
33 EuR. PARI,. DEB. (2-374) 51.
31 Green Paper, supra note 7, at 33.
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that by threatening the cultures of the Member States, the United States
is preventing the unitary development of the European Union.4°
The Directive, therefore, is an attempt by the European Union to
protect the very idea of European integration by exposing the peoples of
the Member States to more European works through the tactic of restrict-
ing the number of non-European television programs and allowing
European producers the chance to create television programs with a
European essence. 1 This is necessary because of the sheer volume of
inexpensive U.S. films and television programs broadcast in the European
Union.42 When the Directive was passed in 1989, U.S.-produced televi-
sion programming in Europe was in excess of $820 million annually and
was expected to double by the 1990s.43 Furthermore, the European
television market has expanded exponentially in recent years, with a
doubling of the available broadcasting airtime.' This has created a
demand for television programming that European producers cannot meet,
o Id. at 28. "European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it.
Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as a European identity." Id. To
control this threat "requires action to counter and direct rather than disguise the bias
of the electronic revolution; it means cultural and quantitative checks." CAREY, supra
note 35, at 138. "Large firms are exporting their products to many countries. This
export, mostly composed of rather low-quality entertainment programmes, uses the
channels of the former colonial system. It is therefore possible to speak of a sui gene-
ris 'imperialism of mass media' representing a tool of neocolonialism." Krzysztof
Przeclawski, The Impact of Cultural Industries in the Field of Audio-Visual Media on
the Socio-Cultural Behavior of Youth, in CULTURAL INDUsTRmS: A CHALLENGE FOR
THE FUrURE OF CULTURE 67, 68 (UNESCO, 1991).
4' See Brian L. Ross, Note, "I Love Lucy," But the European Community Doesn't:
Apparent Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast Market, 16 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 529, 529 (1990). See also Anthony D. King, Introduction: Spaces of Culture,
Spaces of Knowledge, in WORLD-SYSTEM supra note 35, at 16 (The State will create
a national culture over time through its monopoly of policies and resources even if
none existed before).
42 For a thorough overview of the U.S. television threat to the culture of the Eu-
ropean Union, see generally Kaplan, supra note 14 (arguing that the U.S. negotiators
have a philosophical misunderstanding of European Union arguments that it must
protect its culture). See also CAREY, supra note 35, at 114-15 (The United States will
supersede all other social systems by virtue of its number one position in the electronic
revolution).
43 LaFranchi, supra note 1, at 9.
See Philip Revzin & Mark M. Nelson, European T.V. Industry Goes Hollywood,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1989, at A18. Much of this growth can be attributed to two fac-
tors: a steadily rising per capita income among the Member States, and the gradual de-
regulation of the television industry in several Member States. Bruce Stokes, Tinseltown
Trade War, NAT'L J., Feb. 23, 1991, at 432.
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and new broadcasting stations cannot afford.45 "The major handicap
affecting European cultures in the audiovisual field is not the lack of
creative talent (authors, composers) or performing talent (actors, orches-
tras) but the shortage of production facilities."' In order to fill their
programming schedules, European broadcasters have turned to filler
material from the United States, which is available in great abundance
and at a low cost.47 As a result, sellers of U.S. television programs
receive seventy-five percent of all their foreign revenue from European
sales."
III. PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIvE AT ISSUE
The Television Without Frontiers Directive harmonizes the television
broadcasting laws of the Member States of the European Union through
use of a quota, while exempting advertising, news, sports, and teletex
services from that quota.49 Three principal areas are covered in the
Directive: (1) quotas on European programs and independent European
production; (2) rules of advertising; and (3) rules for the protection of
minors' Those specific articles at issue are discussed below.
A. Article 3
Article 3 stipulates that Member States may force "television broad-
casters under their jurisdiction to lay down more detailed or stricter rules
in the area covered by this Directive."' In effect, this article opens the
door for Member States to go beyond the fifty percent minimum Europe-
an works transmission time required by the Directive and further restrict
' See Steven Greenhouse, For Europe, U.S. May Spell T.V., N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1989, at D6.
' CDMM, supra note 35, at 15. In an effort to solve this problem, PolyGram
Filmed Entertainment has called upon the European Union to supply long-term guaran-
tees, interest-subsidized loans, and other forms of financing for European companies
involved in audiovisual production. E.U.: PolyGram Recommends an Independent
Institution to Support European Production Financially, AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 13, 1995.
Greenhouse, supra note 45.
See Elizabeth Guider, Mavens See Bullish Future: Despite Euro Uncertainties,
U.S. Marketgoers Confident, VARI, Apr. 11-17, 1994, at Al. "Vast monopolies of
communication occupying entrenched positions involved a continuous, systematic,
ruthless destruction of elements of permanence essential to cultural activity." HAROLD
A. INms, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF TIME 15 (1952).
'9 Directive, supra note 3, art. 4.
s See Suzanne Michele Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 351, 354 (1991).
" Directive, supra note 3, art. 3.
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the influence of foreign culture. This compromise ensured that France,
which had originally lobbied for a sixty percent European quota, would
support the final agreement.52
B. Article 4
Since its very inception, much of the intense debate regarding the
Directive has centered around Article 4. In part, the article stipulates:
Member states shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means,
that broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of
Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the
time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, and teletext
services 3
In general, "majority" means above fifty percent, with no ultimate
ceiling limiting the maximum proportion of airtime a Member State may
require its broadcasters to reserve for European works.54 The language
"where practicable" raised questions of proper interpretation among the
Member States, with some objecting that the language was far too
ambiguous and did not afford sufficient incentive for European production
of television programs.55 In effect, this article gives the State rather than
the channel the authority to decide what is practicable
56
C. Article 6
Along with Article 4, Article 6 of the Directive has created great
controversy. In very complex terms, Article 6 serves to define exactly
what a European television program consists of for purposes of the
Directive.57 Basically, in order for a television program to be considered
a "European work," it must originate from one of the Member States of
the European Union or non-Member European States that are party to the
'2 See Rone Tempest, France Wants to Slam Europe's Open Door to U.S. T.V.,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, pt. 6, at 1.
53 Directive, supra note 3, art. 4.
' See Jon Filipek, "Cultural Quotas": The Trade Controversy Over the European
Community's Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 323, 328-31 (1992).
'- See E.C. Television Without Frontiers Plan Runs Aground, REUTER NEWSWIRE,
June 14, 1989.
6 See Bruce Alderman, E.C. Quota Vote, VARiETY, Oct. 3, 1989. A good example
of impracticability is the Disney Channel; a European Union official asked, "How can
you have a channel called Disney if it's not allowed to play Disney products?" See
also Yank Fallout Minimal, VARIETY, Sept. 27, 1989, at 4.
' Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.
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European Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of
Europe.58 In order to originate from one of these States, the television
program must also have been mainly made by workers and authors
residing in one or more of those States in accordance with the following
conditions:59
(a) they are made by one or more producers established in one
or more of those States; or
(b) production of the works is supervised and actually con-
trolled by one or more producers established in one or more of those
States; or
(c) the contribution of co-producers of those States to the total
co-production costs is preponderant and the co-production is not con-
trolled by one or more producers established outside those States.' °
While this is clearly a very permissive definition, it is done in an effort
to promote the creation of television programs with more of a European
plot and style than is found in imports from the United States. A Europe-
an plot involves story-lines based more upon European social themes than
those of typical U.S. television shows, while European style depicts
European manners of expression and customs of behavior in contrast to
those of U.S. programs.
Since the Directive was passed seven years ago, all Member States
have implemented it into their national laws and the result has been that
a gradual decline in the number of U.S. television programs shown in the
Member States has taken place, so that as of 1994, roughly only fifty
percent of television programs broadcast on European Union Member
States' television channels are of U.S. origin.6' Even U.S.-owned broad-
53 Id. art. 6(1)(a)(b).
" Id. art. 6(2). Therefore, for the purposes of the Directive, it appears that Europe
extends from Vladivostock to Iceland, and from the North Cape to the Mediterranean
littoral. Collins, supra note 9, at 377. "As one official noted, 'there is a broad con-
sensus that it is Europe in the cultural sense that is in question, not in the geo-political
sense' Id. (quoting Confidential Interview (Dec. 18, 1991)).
o Directive, supra note 3, art 6(2). The European Union is well-aware of the prob-
lems this ambiguous definition has created, and is currently considering revising its
definition of "European work" to provide clearer standards of what constitutes a truly
European television program. Report by the Think-Tank on the Audiovisual Policy in
the European Union 38 (Mar. 1994) [hereinafter Think-Tank].
61 See Pinheiro Goes to Hollywood, TECH EUROPE, Mar. 4, 1994, available in
LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. In contrast, in 1991, 54% of Member States'
television programming was of U.S. origin. Michael Williams & Chris Fuller, Protec-
tionist Stance Thwarts E.C. Deadline Push: France Adamant on GAT, VARIETY, Oct.
18, 1993, at 41. While all Member States have adopted at least a 51.1% European
1996]
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casting station NBC Superchannel has fully complied with the Direc-
tive. 2 Furthermore, in 1989, many anticipated that the Directive would
have a devastating effect on small broadcasting stations within the
Member States.' It was believed that by denying fledgling broadcasting
stations access to cheap and plentiful U.S. television programming, they
would be unable to compete." This has proven largely false because
small broadcasters may circumvent the Directive's quota restrictions by
broadcasting programs such as sports events or game shows which are
exempt from the quota, or even "padding" their schedules with marathon
programming events.' Moreover, it has recently been determined that
most harm and impairment to small European television broadcasters ap-
pears to be a direct result of the lack of any efficient Europe-wide
distribution network.'
The Directive has forced U.S. television studios to work together
with Europeans within the co-production framework of the Directive, or
effectively be locked out of the market of the European Union. 7 Since
works quota, France has established a sixty percent minimum, and the United Kingdom
sixty-five percent. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 295-96.
Super Pledges E.C. Quota, BROADCAST, Jan. 28, 1994, at 5.
Greenhouse, supra note 45.
6 Id.
65 See Quotas are "Harmful, Costly and a Drag," NEW MEDIA MARKETS, June 30,
1994, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS File. This is not as great a
circumvention as American television viewers might expect. In general, European
television broadcast stations operate for significantly fewer hours than their U.S. coun-
terparts. Normally, there is no late-night or morning broadcasting, so European
broadcasters' "off-hours" fall in the daytime viewing schedule, and are therefore
watched by many more viewers than would be expected by U.S. audiences. Charles
Moore & David John White, European Television in the 1990s: Tuning out American
Producers?, 8 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 2 (1990).
' See Audiovisual Production: A Strategy to Create Jobs and Save European Cul-
ture, TECH EUROPE, Apr. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, ECNEWS
File [hereinafter Strategy]. This is because "the American 'majors' controlling all the
links in the audiovisual chain from production to distribution are the only actors
equipped to distribute ... in all the European countries simultaneously." MATrEo
MAGGIORE, AuDIovisuAL PRODUCTION IN THE SINGLE MARKET 61 (1990). This has the
practical effect of restricting European distributors to their national markets. Id. See also
Think-Tank, supra note 60, at 16 (discussing the decline in European audiovisual
industry due to weakness of the distribution networks).
67 TV Trade War, supra note 5. For example, co-production within the framework
of Article VI of the Directive would allow for a U.S. company to provide the capital
financing for a television program in exchange for distribution rights, while the artistic
control over the program would necessarily remain with the European workers, authors,
and producers. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.
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the passage of the. Directive, the largest U.S. studios have been investing
in co-production ventures.' Paramount Pictures acted first by acquiring
a forty-nine percent stake in Zenith, the largest independent television
production company in the United Kingdom.' Lorimar Television fol-
lowed soon afterward, entering into a co-production venture with TV3 in
Spain.70 ABC has acquired interests in Italy, Luxembourg, and Germa-
ny,7' and NBC has taken its own path with NBC Superchannel.' Most
recently, Warner Brothers hired an executive for the specific task of
discovering investment opportunities in the European audiovisual field.'
So, by inducing U.S. studios to relinquish artistic control (and therefore,
cultural control) into the hands of the European authors, workers, and co-
producers in exchange for the more profitable distribution rights, the
quota and co-production provisions of the Directive are orchestrating the
hoped-for result of more television programs being created with a Euro-
pean artistic plot and style, while still allowing U.S. studios to profit
from the European Union market.7
While many commentators have been predicting devastating econom-
ic effects to the European Union's film and broadcasting industry (espe-
cially to new studios and foreign investment) as a result of the Directive,
there are strong indications that this may not be the case.7 As discussed
earlier, a recognized problem with the Directive is that new studios could
circumvent the quota restrictions by broadcasting quota-exempt programs,
or "padding" their schedules in off hours.76 In light of the rush of in-
vestment-seeldng co-production ventures since 1989, it is quite clear that
foreign investment is suffering little as a result of the Directive.' Fur-
' See Jeandine Johnson, In Search of... the European T.V. Show, EUROPE, Nov.
1989, at 22.
1 See Nancy Rivera Brooks, Paramount Buys 49% Stake in British Television Firm,
L.A. TIMs, Nov. 17, 1989, at D5.
" See William Mahoney, Lorimar Sets Series With Spain's TV3, ELEcrRoNIc ME-
DIA, Oct. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, EMEDIA File.
" See Bruce Alderman, ABC Spells Out Euro Strategy, VARifTY, Oct. 4-10, 1989,
at 1, 4 [hereinafter Euro Strategy].
' Super Pledges EC Quota, supra note 62.
73 See Fred Hift, Monster Movies: Blockbuster Films in Europe Made in America,
EUROPE, Oct. 1994, at 26, 28 [hereinafter Monster Movies].
' See Jonathan Weber, Turning the Volume Down, L.A. TIMFs, July 26, 1984, pt.
4, at 1. Co-production also allows a U.S. studio to profit by spreading a limited
amount of capital to more ventures. See also Global Cooling: Hollywood Film Produc-
ers Poised to Spread Influence Worldwide, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 1993, at 66.
Quotas are "Harmful, Costly and a Drag," supra note 65.
76 Id.
' Brooks, supra note 69; Mahoney, supra note 70; Euro Strategy, supra note 71
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thermore, expected growth in demand for television programs will neces-
sitate increased production of European television programs within the
meaning of the Directive, and generate two million jobs in Europe within
the next five years.78 European producers have begun taking advantage
of this boom, and are producing more "European works."'79
The Directive has also worked to facilitate the integration of the
Member States into the hoped-for Single Market by promoting increases
in transborder television broadcasting and increasing competition within
individual markets.' This harmonization has also caused television
broadcasting markets to reorder on a linguistic basis as opposed to a
political basis, with those stations willing to dub or subtitle their pro-
grams moving to the forefront of the market."
IV. LEGALITY OF THE DIRECTIVE UNDER EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Although the European Union was strictly an economic community
at its inception and was thought to have no legal jurisdiction to intrude
upon the cultural sovereignty of the Member States, this conception has
gradually changed over time.82 This change has taken place largely as a
result of the completion of the internal market and the ensuing abolish-
ment of frontiers allowing the free movement of goods, persons, capital
and services.3 Any national legislation of the Member States in these
fields that might restrict the free movement within the European Union,
but may be justified under European Union law, requires harmonization
(the bringing of the national laws of the Member States into comity).'
The most prevalent method of accomplishing this is the directive."
at 4; Super Pledges E.C. Quota, supra note 62; Monster Movies, supra note 73, at 28.
78 Strategy, supra note 66. "[A] number of production companies are springing up
in Europe today." COMMUNICATION POLICIES, supra note 37. The demand for television
programs has risen from 200,000 in 1981 to 650,000 in 1992 as a result of an increase
in the number of available television channels: 40 in 1981 and 100 in 1994. Think-
Tank, supra note 60.
7 COMMUNICATION POLICIES, supra note 37, at 5.
o Collins, supra note 9, at 379.
I' d.
82 See generally ANNEMARIE LOMAN ET AL., CULTURE AND COMMUNITY LAW:
BEFORE AND AFrER MAASTRICHT 177 (1992). With the coming into force of the
Maastricht treaty on Nov. 1, 1993, and its amendments to the Treaty of Rome, culture
is now acknowledged as an integral part of the European Union. See Maastricht Treaty
on Political Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 247, 255 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
Since the 1980s the European Union has had a "cultural policy." COMMUNICATION
POLICIES, supra note 37, at 3.
83 LOMAN UT AL., supra note 82, at 145. See also EEC Treaty, arts. 8A, 130A.
84 LOMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 145.
8 KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW 37-39 (1994). See
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Therefore, "[tihe cultural sector, too, is directly or indirectly susceptible
to the harmonization of the Community,"" because, in many instances
this involvement of the European Union in cultural affairs stems from
"the general tasks of establishing the internal market and ensuring eco-
nomic and social cohesion in the development of the Community."' So,
cultural activities are often also economic activities, or are at least
connected with economic activities via their economic effects.88 "This
simple fact brings them 'automatically' within the scope of the powers of
the Community." 9 However, the Television Without Frontiers Directive
is an example of how, in recent years, measures have been adopted that
tip the scale as being far more cultural in character than economic."
This "can be explained by the drive in the Community to become a more
meaningful entity for the citizens of the Community."'
Even before the Maastricht Treaty explicitly acknowledged culture as
an integral part of the European Union, the Directive was legal under
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty.' Article 60 of the EEC Treaty stipulates
that services are only considered services within the meaning of the
Treaty "in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to
freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons." In simple terms
what this means is that if a television program is distributed via video-
cassette, it is a tangible good and therefore falls within the scope of the
Treaty provisions concerning the free movement of goods.94 However,
the European Court of Justice has ruled that television broadcasts
themselves are services within the meaning of the EEC Treaty.95 This
also supra text accompanying note 3.
8 LOMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 145.
'7 Id. at 177.
91 Id. at 189
89 Id.
90 Id. at 177.
91 Id.
92 EEC Treaty, art. 59. "Within the framework of the provisions set out below, re-
strictions on freedom to provide services within the community shall be progressively
abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of member States who
are established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom
the services are provided." EEC Treaty, art. 59. The right to provide services under
Article 59 is conditional on the issuing of Directives. Steiner, supra note 2, at 208.
9 EEC Treaty, art. 60.
See Cases 60-61/84, Cin6th&que SA v. F&Idration Nationale des Cindmas
Frangais, 1 C.M.L.R. 395 (1986). See also LOMAN, supra note 82, at 81-82.
" Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 426-427. See also Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, 1980
E.C.R. 833 (extending the Sacchi court's ruling to include cable and satellite broad-
casts).
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means that if that same television program is broadcast on Member
States' television stations, it is covered by Article 59.' The Court of
Justice then expanded on its earlier decisions by ruling that the Member
States could develop their own national television broadcasting policies on
cultural grounds, therefore, each Member State could regulate television
programming as it wished.' This meant that harmonization of the na-
tional cultural broadcasting policies became absolutely necessary for the
furtherance of European unity; "the only way to create the conditions of
a single market ... was by establishing Community rules for the protec-
tion of the interests which were the subject of these national provi-
sions. '
Even if the Directive could not have been based on Article 59 at the
time it was created, the EEC Treaty would have provided another legal
basis in Article 235. Article 235 supplies a general grant of power for
action should no other provision of the Treaty provide the legal basis for
an action by the Community that is necessary to achieve an objective of
the Community." Harmonization of the Member States' national televi-
sion broadcasting laws was thought to be necessary to achieve the most
important of all Community objectives, that of Union."° So, any action
by the European Union that had no real connection to the economical
aspect of the common market would have to be tied to Article 235 °"
Articles 59 and 235 have been used to illustrate the gradual intrusion
by the European Union into culture, an area which, at the inception of
the European Community, was thought to be wholly and safely a sover-
eign attribute of the Member States."° The Directive is but an example
of this evolution. Other examples of this gradual evolution of the Europe-
an Union into cultural affairs are the creation of various inter-Union
institutions that engage in the promotion and promulgation of cultural
expressions. 3
Twice a year, the Ministers responsible for culture in the individual
96 LOMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 82.
17 Id. at 155.
98 Id.
99 "If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appro-
priate measures." EEC Treaty, art. 235.
'00 Green Paper, supra note 7, at 1.
... Collins, supra note 9, at 370.
10 LOMAN ET AL., supra note 82.
13 Id. at 141.
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Member States meet with the Council of Ministers to discuss cultural
issues and indicate objectives that are of particular importance to the
European Union.'" Recent meetings have discussed business sponsorship
of cultural activities, the Year of European Cinema and Television (1988),
and established "priority actions" in the realm of culture. 5 The Televi-
sion Without Frontiers Directive is the direct result of the culture Minis-
ters of the Member States establishing a "priority action" in the field of
audiovisuals.' 6
The European Commission itself has incorporated cultural affairs into
its dominion and has created a Commissioner and department (Director-
ate-General X) to oversee audiovisuals, communication, information, and
culture. °" Through its primary task of promulgating European Union
legislation, the Commission may affect culture. °" The Commission also
issues statements on European Union cultural policy in general, and on
more specific cultural policies such as the preservation of the national
heritage of the Member States and the audiovisual sector.'" Other evi-
dence of growing Commission interest in cultural affairs in recent years
is the fact that it has begun participating in cultural exhibitions, giving
official recommendations on cultural affairs, establishing awards and
prizes in culture, and granting subsidies for cultural events."' Further-
more, the Commission has established the Committee of Cultural Advi-
sors, which is comprised of representatives from the world of the arts and
culture and whose task it is to advise the Commission on its intended
,"4 Id. at 142. In preparation for the formal meetings, a Cultural Council has been
created by the Council of Ministers which serves to remove obstacles to the Ministers
making decisions on cultural issues. Id.
" Id. Other topics discussed in recent years were; "cultural cooperation between the
Community and third countries, the designation of a European City of Culture and the
organization of a special European Cultural month event, the preservation of the
national heritage, the film industry ... the development of the theater in Europe,
copyright, European cultural networks, archives, the promotion of theatrical events in
1993, and the possibility of including a Title on Culture in the EEC Treaty. Id. The
Title on Culture was eventually added to the EEC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty. See
EEC Treaty, art. 128.




,to Id. at 143. Examples of such undertakings are the Commission's decision to
participate in the 1992 World Fair, its recommendation of a "European over-sixty" card
entitling the bearer to benefits on cultural activities, the creation of an award for
European architecture, and the establishment of a grant for cultural events with a
European dimension. Id. at 143, nn. 12-15.
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measures in the cultural field.11'
The European Parliament has also gradually entered the cultural
arena as well by debating cultural issues, adopting non-binding resolutions
that state its position on those issues, and making advisory recommenda-
tions thereupon."2 The Parliament also has a committee to deal with
culture which recently dealt with the issue of the circulation of cultural
goods in the Single Market and prompted the Parliament to propose
measures such as restrictions on the exportation of art works to preserve
the national heritages of the Member States."'
This gradual evolution of the European Union into a cultural as well
as an economic union can be illustrated through an historical glance at
some of its legislative enactments. While sporadic statements had been
made prior to 1977, it was at that time that the Commission issued its
first true Communication (a non-binding policy paper) concerning possible
European Union action in the area of culture."' This simply stated that
"the application of the legal means at the disposal of the Community
should in no way lead to interference with cultural expression or to any
intervention in culture as such."' 5
The Commission issued a second Communication to the Council in
1982 regarding Community action on culture." 6 This Communication
served notice that European Union involvement with culture at this time
was still regarded as a complement to action taken with regard to culture
at the international level, although conserving European architectural
heritage is stipulated as one of the European Union's responsibilities."7
By 1987 the European Union had made a major leap forward in its
cultural evolution in anticipation of the completion of the internal market
in 1992. The Commission recognized that action in the realm of culture
had become a necessity to promote European integration in that "the
sense of being part of European culture is one of the prerequisites for
that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market, and the
considerable changes it will bring about in living conditions within the
Community, is to secure the popular support it needs.""... The 1987
"' Id. at 143.
112 Id.
3 Id.
114 Id. at 144. Sporadic statements regarding Community cultural policy such as the
Hague Summit Conferences (1969), Paris (1972), Copenhagen (1973), and the
Tindemans' Report on European Union (1976) had been made in preceding years. Id.
11 Id.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 144-45.
"' Commission of the European Communities, A Fresh Boost for Culture in the
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Communication defined the general cultural policy guidelines and then
proceeded to lay out a "priority program" for 1988 through 1992."'
This included improving access to European cultural resources, creating
a "European cultural area," promoting international dialogue on cultural
issues, and promotion of the European audiovisual industry." The
Television Without Frontiers Directive is a perfect example of just such
a promotion by the European Union.
In recent years, the cultural evolution of the European Union has
culminated in the Maastricht Treaty, which went into effect November 1,
1993.2 Although the Maastricht Treaty was not in effect at the time of
the implementation of the Directive, it is continuing proof of the evolu-
tion of the European Union's power to act in the area of culture rather
than just economics. For example, although the term "culture" was never
explicitly included in the Treaty of Rome, it is included in the Preamble
of the Maastricht Treaty.'
The Maastricht Treaty also includes culture as one of the activities
set out in Article 3 to realize the general purposes of the European Union
as set out in Article 2.' Article 3p stipulates that the activities of the
European Union shall include: "a contribution to education and training
of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States."'"4
By expressly including culture in Article 3 and implicitly including it in
Article 2, the European Union has dispelled all doubts that culture is one
of the principal concerns of the European Union and unequivocally
brought culture under the domain of Article 235 even if European
integration is not threatened as it was when the Directive was issued.
Moreover, the express recognition of cultural objectives as a European
Union concern "provides the Court of Justice with a point of reference
for taking cultural interests into account in the context of its teleological
interpretations of provisions of Community law."'
The Maastricht Treaty revisions also added the Title on Culture to
European Community, COM(87)603 final.
19 LOMAN Er AL., supra note 82, at 145.
"I Id.
2 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82.
'" Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, Preamble. After the changes wrought by the
Maastricht Treaty, the EEC Treaty Preamble now stresses the desire to deepen the
solidarity of the citizens of the Member States "while respecting their history, their
culture and their traditions." Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, Preamble.
" See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, arts. 2, 3.
124 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, art. 3p.
'25 LOMAN Er AL., supra note 82, at 191.
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the EEC Treaty."2 This provision, embodied in Article 128, allows for
the development of a European cultural policy while also allowing the
individual Member States their own policies that are also aimed at
preserving European cultures." Article 128 provides for two methods
the European Union may use in promulgating cultural legislation: if the
measure is aimed at a purely cultural matter it may find legality under
Article 128, whereas if the measure's objective is a mix of cultural and
economic effects, the old method of utilizing Article 235 is retained."
One important aspect of Article 128 is the fact that audiovisuals are listed
under its provisions as one of the areas in which the European Union
may take action." This is further evidence that the European Union has
viewed the Directive as protecting a cultural matter rather than economic
protectionism.
V. LEGALITY OF THE DIREcTIVE UNDER GATT AND GATS
From the time of the passage of the Directive by the European
Union, the United States has claimed that it is in violation of the GATT
because television programs are not services, but products, and that, in
the absence of a services trade agreement, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) fills the void. 30 This misunderstanding seems
to have persisted even in the face of the passage of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS) at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. No acceptable compromise on the issue of audiovisuals could be
reached by U.S. and European Union negotiators, and rather than side-
track the entire trade deal, audiovisuals were excluded from the GATT"
and GATS trade regime.'
' Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, art. 128.
127 Id. Article 128 says, in part, that "1. The Community shall contribute to the
flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and
regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the
fore. 2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between
Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the
following areas: improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and
history of the European Peoples; conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of
European significance; . . . artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual
sector . . . . 4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its actions
under other provisions of this Treaty." Id.
128 Id.
"2 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 82, art. 128 (2).
'30 See Administration Urged to Protect U.S. Access to E.C. Broadcast Market, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA) 7, at 8 (Oct. 13, 1989).
"' For an overview of the exclusion of audiovisuals, see Jonas M. Grant, 'Jurassic'
Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the Audiovisual Sector from the GATT, 70 IND. L.J.
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The GATT has its origins in the desire of those who shaped the
international economic system and institutions after the devastation of the
Second World War to avoid the mistakes of the pre-war era.' The
result "is the only multilateral instrument that lays down agreed rules for
the conduct of international trade."' 3 Its overarching principal objective
is the liberalization of international trade through negotiated reductions in
both tariff and non-tariff barriers."3
After the initial framework was created in the aftermath of the
Second World War, subsequent "rounds" of negotiations promoted the
evolution of the GAT. For example, the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) of
negotiations resulted in a fifty percent tariff cut, while the Tokyo Round
(1973-1979) made a step toward creating improved rules regarding non-
tariff barriers to trade.'35 However, it was not until the recent Uruguay
Round of negotiations that the GATT finally evolved fully. With the
completion of the negotiations in late 1994 and subsequent adoption by
signatory nations, the GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) as of January 1, 1995.'"
The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations had as its objectives
the further liberalization of international trade through the reduction of
tariff and other non-tariff barriers, protection of intellectual property
rights, a complete overhaul of the GATE dispute-settlement machinery,
and a decision on whether or not to include agriculture, an investment
code, culture, or services under the GATT provisions.'37 It was on the
issue of whether culture and audiovisual services should be included
under the GAIT that the European Union and United States negotiating
sides were diametrically opposed. '38
The United States argued that no cultural exemption should be
1333 (1995); Howard M. Endelman, Comment, Regulating Culture: The Audiovisual
Controversy in the GAIT Accord, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 443 (1995).
,3 SIDNEY GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, ISSUES & PROS-
PEcrs, 2 (1988)
133 Id.
'34 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE URUGUAY ROUND: GLOBAL AGREEMENT-GLOBAL
BENEMS 23 (1994) [hereinafter THE URUGUAY ROUND].
"3 William B. Kelly, The GAIT and the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The GAIT Perspective, in CONFLICr AND RESOLUTION IN US-EC TRADE
RELATIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 7, 13 (Seymour J. Rubin et al.
eds., 1989).
t Bruce Bamard, World Trade Organization, EUROPE, Nov. 1994, at 22.
'n THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 134.
,3 Michael Williams & Chris Fuller, Protectionist Stance Thwarts E.C. Deadline
Push; France Adamant on GATT, VARETY EUROPE, Oct. 18, 1993, at 41.
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allowed in the GATr or the GATS, either as part of the general frame-
work of the agreement or in any annex concerning audiovisuals.'39 The
basis for this argument was the contention that cultural identities were
very difficult to define, and therefore the possibility for abuse would be
great.'"' Furthermore, according to the United States, the European
Union could not possibly qualify for any "cultural exemption" regardless,
because there was no such thing as a European culture. 4' This misun-
derstanding of the European Union's goal of European integration would
serve to hinder all negotiation on the subject. 42
The misunderstanding of the European Union's cultural objective in
promulgating the Directive was further evidenced when the United States
called the Directive "blatant protectionism unmasked" and accused the
European Union of using the issue of culture "as a smokescreen for
monetary concerns."'43 The United States subsequently entered into
mandatory GATI consultations with the European Union in an unsuc-
cessful effort to resolve their differences.'"
When no agreement was reached in the GATT consultations, the
United States regarded the matter as solved. According to United States
negotiators, the GATT applied to culture and audiovisual services, and
therefore the Directive was in direct violation of several GATT provisions
and was "inconsistent with the Community's obligations."'"
The United States first argued that the Directive was in violation of
the Most Favored Nation (MFN) requirement of Article I of the GATT
which requires that any advantages granted to one contracting party by
another contracting party have to be extended to all other contracting
parties.'" Simply put, MFN requires a nation to treat all foreign goods
equally, while allowing domestic products to be favored. 47 The United
Filipek, supra note 54, at 343.
'4 Services-Audio-Video Sector Working Group, 75 GATT FOCUS 10 (1990).
'4" Kaplan, supra note 14, at 315.
142 Id.
"4 Valenti Charges, supra note 6.
,44 See Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television Programming and GATT:
An Analysis of Why the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 97, 106-07
(1993).
'45 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PUB. No. 56, PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CARLA A. HILLS 4, (1989).
"4' Filipek, supra note 54, at 346. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT 255 (1969).
147 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 273. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XXIV
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States recognized that the European Union may accord preferential
treatment among the Member States through Article XXIV's implicit
exemption of MFN among members of a customs union.Y However,
according to the United States, the European works quota of the Directive
violated the MFN principle because it extended non-European Union
European nations more favorable treatment than other contracting par-
ties.149
The United States also argued that the European Union breached the
national treatment requirement of Article III of the GATT."'° The na-
tional treatment requirement stipulates that imported goods will be
accorded the same treatment as domestic goods with respect to most
matters under government control, such as trade, commercial regulation,
and taxation."' The United States argued that the Directive was in
violation of Article I because by restricting the number of foreign-
produced programs that may be broadcast without a corresponding
restriction on European works, the Directive grants imported programs
less favorable treatment than that given to European programs with
respect to regulations and laws concerning their sale, purchase, distribu-
tion, or use.1
5 2
The final GATT argument of the United States against the Directive
was based on Article X's prohibition of quotas, or quantitative restric-
tions. This Article forbids the use of any trade restrictions other than
tariffs placed on the exportation or importation of products."4 According
to the United States, by requiring the Member States to institute a quota
for European television programs, the Directive violated Article XI. 5 In
the eyes of the United States this is because the European works quota
acts as a de facto quota on imports due to the fact that it limits the
number of foreign television programs that may be imported into the
European Union."6 Because European Union broadcasters may not
[hereinafter GATI].
143 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 576-77. See also Filipek, supra note 54, at 347.
149 Filipek, supra note 54, at 347. For example, those non-Member States like
Switzerland, that are party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Television of
the Council of Europe are considered originators of "European works" within the
meaning of Article VI of the Directive. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(1)(a),(b).
"S Filipek, supra note 54, at 347-48. See also GATT, supra note 147, art. Ill.
151 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 273.
'5 Filipek, supra note 54, at 348-49.
1 Id. at 349. See also GATT, supra note 150, art. XI.
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broadcast more foreign programs than allowed by the Directive, the
theory is that they will necessarily reduce their purchases of U.S. televi-
sion programs." 7
In contrast, the European Union advanced its own arguments regard-
ing the legality of the Directive under the GATT, should it be deemed to
apply to television broadcasting. According to the European Union,
general principles of international trade law recognize a "cultural exemp-
tion" for products that have a "cultural" character, and therefore, a cultur-
al exemption allowing measures such as the Directive should be added to
the GAT.' 58 This argument for a cultural exemption to the GATT for
measures like the Directive is based on Article IV of the GATT which
allows screen quotas for films of national origin."9 In the aftermath of
the Second World War and its many propaganda films, the great impor-
tance that motion pictures had in the cultural influence of societies was
clearly recognized."W Furthermore, other nations recognized the domi-
nance of the U.S. film industry, and responded with quotas on foreign
films.'6 ' During various negotiations such as the International Trade
Organization and Havana Charter prior to the original GATT agreement,
protection and discrimination in the film arena was vigorously advocated
by many nations due to the importance film had for a nation's cultural
survival.'62 This eventually resulted in the Article IV cultural exemption
for film from the GAIT obligations.'63
The original GATT negotiations took place before the advent of
large scale television broadcasting. However, it is conceivable that televi-
sion programs would have been considered a product and therefore would
have been included in the Article IV cultural exemption had the original
drafters foreseen the immense growth in the industry and its correspond-
ing impact on cultures of the world.' In fact, the United States itself
157 Id.
,' Kaplan, supra note 14, at 334.
159 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 293. "The objections of nations that had domestic
film quotas led the GATI draftsmen to except this product ... because its regulation
was more related to domestic cultural policies than to economics and trade." Id. See
also GATT, supra note 147, art. IV.
,60 GARTH S. JowErr & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 102
(1986). See also GARTH S. JowErr & JAMES M. LINTON, MOVIES AS MASS COMMUNI-
CATION (1980).
161 Smith, supra note 144, at 118.
6 Id. at 118-19. The ITO was the ill-fated predecessor of the WTO that was
doomed by the failure of the United States Congress to ratify its charter in 1949.
JACKSON, supra note 146, at 50. The Havana Charter was the main conference for
drafting the 1TO charter. Id. at 45.
263 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 293.
" Since the time of the original GATT negotiations "television has taken over from
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did just that during GATT negotiations in the 1960s.'" While noting
that restrictions against foreign television programs were technically
discrimination, and therefore a violation of Article III of the GAIT, the
United States recognized that some of the principles of Article IV re-
garding the cultural influence of films might indeed apply to television
programs as well.'" Moreover, in contrast to its position during the
Uruguay Round, in 1961 the United States proposed a resolution that for-
eign television programs be restricted to a "reasonable proportion" of a
nation's domestic television stations' broadcast time."
In exactly the same fashion as those concerned nations in the days
of the original GATT negotiations regarded film, the European Union
claims that the protection and promotion of indigenous languages, history,
and heritage depends heavily on national television programming output.
The Directive will accomplish this protection and promotion for the
Member States and European integration through its European works
requirement in a subtle fashion. Logically, aspects of television programs
created by European producers or co-productions are more likely to
project a more European plot, style, and language than U.S. programs.
Further argument that the United States should recognize a cultural
exemption for the European Union may be found in the relations between
the United States and Canada." In the same way as the European
Union in the 1980s, during the 1970s, Canada became aware of the
cultural implications of U.S. television shows crossing its border and soon
implemented a tax incentive to promote Canadian television programs.'"
After much negotiation, the United States recognized the cultural impor-
tance of television programs and acquiesced to Canada's position.'70 In
1989 this cultural exemption for Canada was recognized explicitly in the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, whereby the United States
agreed to respect very strict quotas on its television programming.7
This right of Canada to protect its cultural identity was explicitly stated
the cinema, and cinema films have been replaced by television film series, but the
effect is the same as far as cultural influence is concerned." Augustin Girard, Cultural
Industries: A Handicap or a New Opportunity for General Development?, in CULTURAL
INDusTRIEs: A CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE OF CULTURE 24, 26 (UNESCO, 1982).
16 JACKSON, supra note 146, at 294. But see Smith, supra note 144, at 116-17.
" JACKSON, supra note 146, at 294. See also GATr Does. U11615; 111646; 111686
(1961)
,67 GATT Doe. 111646 (1961), at 3. See also Smith, supra note 144, at 116-17.
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in Article 2005 of the Free Trade Agreement." Moreover, the North
American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States specifically exempts Canadian cultural industries such as television
broadcasting."
This action on the part of the United States did not go unnoticed.
The European Union recognized that the United States agreed to the
cultural exemptions for Canada because if the issue were pushed, it
"knew very well that this type of good or product would not fall under
the regimentation of the GATT."'' In its relations with its neighbors the
United States had recognized their rights to cultural exemptions for their
television broadcasting industries. Why not do the same for the European
Union? Strong indications point to money. The European Union's televi-
sion market provides Hollywood with seventy-five percent of its foreign
television sales." Understandably, such a lucrative market simply will
not be relinquished by the United States without a fight.'76 However, it
is quite possible that in its cultural exemption argument the European
Union is correct, and television programs should be accorded the same
treatment and cultural exemption as film under Article IV of the GATT.
Regardless of these arguments, the aim of the European Union
during the Uruguay Round was to have cultural industries such as audio-
visuals declared as having no legal substance under the GATr, thereby
giving the GATT no jurisdiction over the Directive at all.'" While a
cultural exemption was not explicitly agreed upon in the Uruguay Round,
the European Union did win a mixed victory. Although "cultural goods"
were included under the GATT, the European Union was granted an
exemption from its MFN obligations with regard to cultural protection
agreements' among the Member States.'78 However, the United States
still claimed that the Directive was subject to the GATT because televi-
sion programming constituted a good rather than a service. 79
In direct contrast to the United States' position, the European Union
172 The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, B.D.I.E.L. 359,
at Article 2005.
173 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
Mexican States, 1993, pt. 8, ch. 2, arts. 2101, 2106, annex 2106.
174 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 3-381) 123 (Oct. 11, 1989).
175 Guider, supra note 48.
176 Global Cooling: Hollywood Film Producers Poised to Spread Influence
Worldwide, HOLLYWOOD FILM REP., Nov. 1993, at 66.
Filipek, supra note 54, at 344.
' Kaplan, supra note 14, at 343.
179 135 CONG. REC., at H7327 (1989).
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maintained that television broadcasting was a service, and therefore not
covered by the GATE.W This view was supported by the European
Court of Justice decisions in Sacchi, which held that television broadcasts
are services,"and Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, which further
solidified the European Union notion that a television broadcast is a
service to those who receive it, even in another Member State."
In reality, the United States has already recognized that television
broadcasting is a service rather than a good. As recently as 1991, the
United States identified restrictions on television broadcasts of foreign
television programs by Australia, Brazil, Canada, and various Pacific Rim
nations as "service barriers." ' Even in past GATT negotiations them-
selves, the United States has recognized that television broadcasting is a
service84
The most powerful argument confirming the European Union's view
that television broadcasts are services rather than goods comes from a
look at television broadcasts themselves. When the GATT negotiations
regarding services were first begun, the difficulty of defining services was
apparent; one exasperated speaker arguing that they are "anything you
can't drop on your foot."'" Simply put, goods are tangible products
while services are intangible. 86 Moreover, goods may be stored, while
services must be consumed concurrently with their production.' The
important distinction between cultural goods of a durable nature and the
services that flow out of them is essential for understanding the issue of
" Jan D'Alessandro, Note, A Trade-Based Response to Intellectual Property Piracy:
A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion Picture Industry, 76 GEO. LJ. 417, 453
(1987).
1S Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 426-427. See also Procureur du Roi v. Debavue, 1980
E.C.R. 833 (extending the Sacchi ruling to include cable and satellite broadcasts).
" Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 2085, 2110.
'1 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 1991 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRmRs (1991); See also CoNGREssIONAL BuDGEr
OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE PoLICY 127 (1987) (arguing that
trade in television programs should be included in the Uruguay Round service negotia-
tions).
"" Reply to Questions Put Forward by the American Delegation on the Television
Without Frontiers Directive and on the Convention of the Council of Europe 5 (no
date).
115 A GA7T for Services, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1985, at 20.
'' Michael Cohen & Thomas Morante, Elimination of Non-tariff Barriers to Trade:
Recommendations for Future Negotiations, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 495, 498
(1981). See also Augustin Girard, supra note 164, at 37 (holding that television pro-
grams are services).
" Jagdish Bhagwati, Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND 207, 208 (1987).
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television broadcasting as a service instead of a good.88 For example,
the distinction between a tangible good, such as a videotape of a televi-
sion program, and a service, such as the broadcast of a television pro-
gram is very subtle, yet the former is tangible and may be stored and is
therefore a good, while the latter is intangible and can is consumed upon
production and is a service (unless it is recorded on a videotape, where-
upon it becomes a good).'89 This is the view that ultimately prevailed
in the Uruguay Round.
To this end, the issue of services became a hotly debated topic
during the Uruguay Round. The United States argued that audiovisuals
were not a service, and the European Union maintained the opposite
position.Y The Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS) was subse-
quently created in an effort to clarify the services issues regarding
audiovisuals, banking, insurance, etc. 9 ' The GNS soon assembled the
Audiovisual Sector Working Group to examine trade issues concerning
audiovisuals, especially those involving television broadcasting.' In
1987 the United States proposed that the GATS be created as a mirror
image of the GATT framework applied to services.Y At the same time,
developing nations resisted this proposal on the grounds that the GATT
was not yet a fully established framework, and was not applicable to
trade in services." 4
At the very recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the GATS was
sanctioned, and services thereby became covered by a GAT-like interna-
tional trade agreement regulating trade in services. 5 As a legal frame-
work, the GATS is the first multilateral, legally enforceable agreement to
cover investment and trade in services sectors." Predictably, the GATS
In Albert Breton, Introduction to an Economics of Culture: A Liberal Approach, in
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES: A CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE OF CULTURE 40, 41 (1982).
189 Id.
'9 See supra note 179.
'91 Filipek, supra note 54, at 343.
192 Id.
193 See 1 LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAfT 1 (K. Simonds & B. Hill eds.
1990). See also GOLT, supra note 132, at 44.
194 GOLT, supra note 132, at 45.
195 THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 134. Services are broken down into "sectors"
which signatory nations then make market access commitments to. Annex 1B, General
Agreement on Trade in Services, in 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, art XVII [hereinafter Annex 1B].
96 John Siegmund, Services: U.S. Objectives in International Trade in Services,
BUSINESS AMERICA, Jan. 1994, at 8. Part I of the GATS gives the general scope of
the agreement; Part II lays out the general obligations of signatories; Part III deals with
making commitments in the specific service sectors; and Part IV commits the signato-
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reiterates the MFN, national treatment, and market access principles of the
GATT; however exceptions are far easier to obtain."9 Signatory nations
must make "offers" of what their commitments are to the open market in
services sectors, and this binds the nation to its offer.19 As a result of
the exclusion of audiovisuals from the GATS, the European Union made
no commitment to open its audiovisual market to foreign competition, and
no national treatment commitment.' 99 Furthermore, the European Union
was granted a MFN exemption with respect to audiovisuals, and therefore
is not bound in any way to give equal treatment to third nations with
regard to trade in television programming for the next ten years.' In
effect, the Directive is now fully legal under the GATT and GATS trade
regimes. Furthermore, the United States has no basis for recourse against
the European Union with respect to audiovisuals through the WTO
dispute mechanisms as was thought possible prior to the GATT.
VI. RECENT EVENTS
During the Uruguay Round, it became obvious to the European
Union that its goals were in danger due to the failure of several Member
States to implement the Directive properly. °t With the exclusion of
audiovisuals from the GATT and the resulting GATS agreement the
European Union is free to expand upon the Directive and even bring in
new protective measures without fear of retaliation by the United States
through the implementation of the WTO dispute mechanisms.' As a
result, the European Union has moved to tighten the ambiguous "Europe-
an works" language of Article 6, and impose even stricter quotas that the
50.1% currently advocated by the Directive. 3
Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPA), and the man "regarded as the bete noire" of the European
ries to progressive liberalization. HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, July
1994, at 64 [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
"9 General Agreement on Trade in Services, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1993,
MTN/FA H-Al B1. The GATS permits countries to take a one-time exemption (not to
exceed 10 years) from MFN treatment prior to the entry into force of the GATS.
HANDBOOK, supra note 196, at 65.
11 THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 134.
19 Id.
Id. See also supra text accompanying note 197.
2l See Adam Dawtrey, "Park" Provokes Protectionists: GA7T Gets France's Goat,
VARIETY, Sept. 27, 1993, at 31. For example, France was warned for applying its
quotas too rigorously. Id.
Europe Hails GA7T Win but Row Goes On, SCREEN FINANCE, Dec. 15, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, PTS-PROMPT Database.
203 COMMUNICATION POLICIES, supra note 37, at 6.
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audiovisual industry, subsequently offered the olive branch to the Europe-
an Union at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.' In recognition of
the fact that if the United States film industry wishes to continue to profit
in the European Union, it now has little choice but to work within the
confines of the Directive, this olive branch has recently been replaced
with an offer by Valenti and the MPA to provide money to the European
Union audiovisual industry for training and more co-production coopera-
tion 205
As examined earlier, this current state of cooperation and co-produc-
tion blossoming between the European Union and the United States is a
foreshadowing of the best possible method for the European Union to
continue to protect its culture, and the United States to profit economical-
ly. This method is a continuation and expansion of co-production between
the two sides in a mutually beneficial manner. For the Americans, it
offers the advantage of getting into the European market with minimal
risk and the possibility of simultaneously evaluating the reliability and
efficiency of potential partners for possible future joint ventures.' For
the Europeans, co-production allows the retention of artistic control with
an added bonus in the possibility of gaining access to the American
market for their own productions and keeping their costs low.'
CONCLUSION
Seven years after it was first unveiled amidst much attack from the
United States, the Television Without Frontiers Directive has finally come
into its own. Because of the recent GATS victory for the European Union
in the Uruguay Round, the Directive's restrictions may be safely increased
if deemed necessary, bringing the Member States into even greater unity.
Today, the European Union may continue to evolve into a "United States
of Europe" without fear of becoming a mirror image of the United States
of America.
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